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The Camarena Affair 
On February 9, 1985, members of the Mexican Guadalajara drug cartel murdered 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency special agent Enrique “Kiki” Camarena Salazar.1 At the 
time of his murder, American drug enforcement agents working in Mexico were not 
allowed to conduct or participate in surveillance flights documenting drug cultivation and 
production.2 Be that as it was, in the months leading up to their deaths, Camarena and 
Mexican pilot Alfredo Zavala Avelar had been flying undercover reconnaissance 
                                                
1 Elaine Shannon. Desperados: Latin Drug Lords, U.S. Lawmen, and the War America 
Can't Win. (New York: Viking, 1988), Chapter 11. 
2 United States Embassy. “Narcotics—GOM Requests Elimination of DEA Spotters.” 
1978. (Digital National Security Archive), 2. 
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missions in northwestern Mexico, and in doing so came across a drug cultivation oasis in 
the middle of the desert. In an uninhabited area of Chihuahua, Camarena and Zavala 
spotted an enormous marijuana plantation. Rumors of large-scale, desert marijuana-
growing operations had reached DEA ears, but to date there had been little evidence to 
substantiate claims that such operations existed. Camarena and Zavala now had proof.3  
 Called Rancho Búfalo, the plantation was owned by, among others, the founding 
members of the Guadalajara Cartel. Elaine Shannon describes the plantation in her 1988 
book Desperados: Latin Drug Lords, U.S. Lawmen, and the War American Can’t Win. 
Approximately 7,000 Mexicans labored on and operated Rancho Búfalo.4 Shannon states 
that Mexican security forces, in addition to cartel gunmen, patrolled the perimeter of the 
operation. Although high-level drug traffickers owned the plantation, an operation the 
size and scope of Rancho Búfalo could not exist if authorities did not purposely look 
away. Camarena and Zavala had not only happened upon the largest drug production 
operation in Mexican history to date; their discovery also served to corroborate the 
purported corruption that permeated all levels of the Mexican government.  
DEA agents including Camarena and Mexican law enforcement personnel raided 
Rancho Búfalo in November 1984, three months before the special agent’s assassination. 
Although the raid produced one of the largest seizures of illegal drugs of the decade, 
neither the managers of the plantation or the leaders of the Guadalajara Cartel were 
                                                
3 Shannon, 194-198. 
4 Although Elaine Shannon’s book is based, at least in part, on scholarly research and 
primary source materials like newspapers and personal interviews, her description of the 
U.S.-Mexico “War on Drugs” can only be relied upon to a limited extent, as her writing 
is decidedly sensational and pointedly provocative. Desperados is repeatedly cited by 
other works consulted for this thesis, a fact that should inspire some confidence in her 
writing. Her depiction of the Camarena murder and Rancho Búfalo must nevertheless be 
taken with a grain of salt. 
 5 
caught. There had been an information leak. Those in charge had fled after being tipped 
off. The bust netted only the low-level laborers still working at the ranch who hadn’t been 
informed about the raid.5  
 Camarena and Zavala were killed for their discovery. The news of Camarena’s 
slaying touched off a major diplomatic incident between the U.S. and Mexico. 
Furthermore, the U.S.-Mexico “War on Drugs”6 became a subject of interest for the 
American population at large in the wake of the ordeal. Shannon’s Desperados—in 
which she uses the Camarena murder to argue that the U.S. can’t win the “War on 
Drugs”—was a best seller and later adapted into an Emmy-winning miniseries. Although 
the U.S.-Mexico “War on Drugs” did not begin with the Camarena murder, it seems that 
his death was a tipping point for the “war” in the American popular imagination. But 
what had led up to the Camarena affair?  
Looking Back: The Beginnings of the U.S.-Mexico “War on Drugs” 
The U.S.-Mexico “War on Drugs” garnered comparatively little attention before 
the American agent’s murder. Of course, a major international incident will garner 
widespread attention, especially when it is perceived as a “new” issue. But the U.S. and 
Mexico had been waging the “drug war” in the years leading up to Camarena’s death. It 
appears that the U.S.-Mexico “War on Drugs” dates from at least 1969, the year that 
Richard Nixon assumed the presidency of the United States.  
The history of the U.S.-Mexico counternarcotics relationship is dense and 
convoluted. The pre-Camarena period is no less confusing than the post-Camarena 
                                                
5 Ibid., 194-198. 
6 I put “War on Drugs” in quotes because the “drug war” is not necessarily a real war, nor 
is it necessarily a war on drugs, a societally defined group of inanimate substances. 
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period. Looking at the U.S.-Mexico “drug war” from the late 1960s to the late 1970s, 
however, provides a lens through which one can analyze the conflict in its post-1985 
state. This lens might help to answer the question of why the DEA, an American law 
enforcement agency, was operating in Mexico. Yet any answer will be incomplete and 
messy, as the “War on Drugs” is not as simple as its name makes it out to be.  
The “War on Drugs” was one of several “wars” being fought by both Mexico and 
the United States from the late 1960s to late 1970s. Mexico was an active participant and 
key ally of the United States in the Cold War. Additionally, the 1970s were the worst 
years of Mexico’s “Dirty War,”7 a period of time during which the country’s ruling party, 
the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), repressed political dissidents, leftist students, 
and other marginalized populations. The confluence of these “wars” with the U.S.-
Mexico “War on Drugs” represents a complex time. Although these conflicts sometimes 
pursued parallel goals, the Cold War, the “Dirty War,” and the “War on Drugs” 
contradicted one another in surprising and frustrating ways. But one purpose appears to 
have motivated them all: the desire to preserve and perpetuate a U.S.-centric “status 
quo.”8  
Although the “wars” cannot be compared in their entireties, elements of them can 
be. Certain policies, motivations, and actions of the “wars” overlap. And it is when they 
overlap that this “status quo” can be defined. Domestically, the U.S. used the “War on 
Drugs” to maintain its traditional racial and social “status quos.” After the abolition of 
                                                
7 “Dirty War” appears in quotes, as that is how I have seen it written in several different 
sources. Like the “War on Drugs,” the “Dirty War” was also not necessarily a real war, 
pitting two belligerent combatants against one another. 
8 I decided to put “status quo” in quotation marks because, like the “War on Drugs,” it is 
something that is up for a great deal of interpretation.  
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Jim Crow segregation, the U.S. government started the “War on Drugs” to preserve 
white, conservative hegemony.9 African Americans were disproportionately affected by 
the “drug war.” John Ehrlichman, one of Nixon’s trusted assistants, admitted this in a 
2016 Harper’s Magazine article titled “Legalize It All: How to Win the War on Drugs.” 
According to Ehrlichman, 
The Nixon campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White House after that, had two 
enemies: the antiwar left and black people…We knew we couldn’t make it illegal 
to be either against the war or black, but by getting the public to associate the 
hippies with marijuana and blacks with heroin, and then criminalizing both 
heavily, we could disrupt those communities. We could arrest their leaders, raid 
their homes, break up their meetings, and vilify them night after night on the 
evening news. Did we know we were lying about the drugs? Of course we did.10  
 
African Americans and the antiwar left, however, were not the only groups to suffer 
because of the “drug war.” Mexicans, too, suffered from Nixon’s “law and order” politics 
and the “War on Drugs.”  
But was the United States’ “drug war” in Mexico designed to achieve racist ends? 
Maybe, but the U.S. government’s drug control agenda in Mexico is not so clear. 
Looking at U.S.-Mexico counternarcotics policy from the late 1960s to late 1970s, one 
can see how the “drug war” enabled the U.S. “[to do] overtly what it had often done 
covertly: subordinate Latin American nations”11 politically, economically, and socially.  
As the United States’ neighbor, Mexico has felt the weight of this reality arguably 
more than any other country in the Western Hemisphere. The “drug war” has allowed the 
United States government to criminalize Mexico as a nation, and to demonize its people 
                                                
9 Michael H. Tonry. Punishing Race: A Continuing American Dilemma. (New York: 
Oxford UP, 2011), Chapter 1. 
10 John Ehrlichman, quoted in Dan Baum. “Legalize It All: How to Win the War on 
Drugs.” (Harper’s Magazine, April 2016), 22.  
11 Bruce Bullington, and Allen A. Block. "A Trojan Horse: Anti-Communism and the 
War on Drugs." (Contemporary Crises 14.1, 1990), 39. 
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while distancing America’s politically powerful white majority from the onus of its drug 
problem. Although the U.S.-Mexico “drug war” has accomplished precious little in the 
way of interdicting, intercepting, and eradicating drugs,12 it has been an effective method 
of social control and of maintaining the American “status quo.”  
Review of Literature 
This thesis uses the arguments of legal scholar Michelle Alexander and Latin 
American historian Greg Grandin to analyze the ways in which the U.S.-Mexico “War on 
Drugs” preserved and perpetuated a U.S.-centric “status quo.” Alexander concurs with 
Ehrlichman’s assessment. She describes the “drug war” in the United States as a means to 
permanently relegate black and brown people to a criminal underclass. In her estimation, 
the U.S. created a drug crime problem to solve a social control problem.13 Drawing on 
Alexander’s argument, this thesis contends that the U.S. used the “War on Drugs” from 
the late 1960s onwards as a form of social control that criminalized Mexicans, and that 
perpetuated a “status quo” in which a white, conservative U.S. could continue to 
dominate the Western Hemisphere.  
In fact, the “War on Drugs” in Mexico may predate the “drug war” in the U.S. as 
a form of social control. Ehrlichman intimated this in 1969 when he said “there is 
apprehension [that the U.S. gives] higher priority to drug control in the U.S. than to good 
relations in Latin America.”14 Greg Grandin’s work Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, 
the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism describes Latin America as a 
                                                
12 Arthur Benavie. Drugs: America's Holy War. (New York: Routledge, 2009), Chapter 1. 
13 Michelle Alexander. The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of 
Colorblindness. (New York: New, 2012), Chapter 1. 
14 United, States Embassy. “Negotiations on Operation Cooperation.” 1969. (Digital 
National Security Archive), 1. 
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“workshop” for the American Empire. In this sense, Latin America is a proving ground in 
which the U.S. has perfected strategies, tactics, and policies it has applied at home and 
elsewhere in the world.15 This thesis takes Grandin’s assertion and applies it to the “drug 
war.” The U.S. may used the “War on Drugs” in Mexico to experiment with law 
enforcement strategies that were later implemented in the U.S. and in other Latin 
American countries. In doing so, it could be argued, the U.S. used Mexico as a laboratory 
in which to experiment with the preservation of its “status quo.” 
While Alexander sees the domestic “drug war” as the progeny of Jim Crow, 
scholars like Bruce Bullington and Allen A. Block view the U.S.’s “War on Drugs” in 
Latin America as an extension of the Cold War. For Bullington and Block, the “drug war” 
was born not of Jim Crow, but of the U.S.’s pressing desire to halt the spread of 
communism in Latin America. Grandin’s work can be used to elaborate on this analysis 
of the “drug war,” as well. In his work The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the 
Cold War, Grandin treats the Cold War in Latin America as a counter-revolution against 
elements of the Latin American left.16 This thesis employs Grandin’s counter-
revolutionary conception of the Cold War in Latin America to draw a connection 
between the U.S. “drug war” in Mexico and the U.S. anticommunist agenda. In 
attempting to establish this link, this thesis suggests that the Cold War and the “War on 
Drugs” in Mexico essentially served the same purpose—the preservation of an anti-leftist 
“status quo.” 
                                                
15 Greg Grandin. Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of 
the New Imperialism. (New York: Metropolitan, 2006), Introduction. 
16 Greg Grandin. The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War. (Chicago: 
U of Chicago, 2004), Conclusion. 
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Documentation produced by U.S. government agencies must be examined in 
order to understand the United States’ political agenda in Mexico, however. The Digital 
National Security Archive’s (DNSA) collections of declassified U.S. government 
documents entitled U.S.-Mexico Counternarcotics Policy, 1969-2013 provides this 
material. In addition to the Counternarcotics Policy archive, the DNSA has published 
U.S. government documents concerning the 1968 Tlatelolco Massacre. The documents 
contained in these archives provide a rare window through which one can observe inner 
workings of the U.S. government. And because the information contained therein was 
classified, it is likely that DNSA material offers a less-filtered presentation of the U.S.’s 
political intentions. Because of the content and origins of these collections, sources from 
the DNSA are the backbone of this thesis.  
Although sources from the DNSA’s collections form the archival foundation of 
this thesis, the examined material is not without information gaps and contradictions. In 
other words, the DNSA’s collections of declassified U.S. government documents do not 
constitute a proverbial smoking gun that leads to a clear understanding of the U.S.’s 
“drug war” in Mexico. Confusion, ineptitude, and secrecy are manifest throughout the 
archive. In addition, the bureaucratic language of the government documents can be 
maddeningly vague. On top of that, the documents are often redacted, sometimes to the 
point of near-total censorship. Moments of candor like that offered by John Ehrlichman 
are few. Analyzing the preservation and perpetuation of a U.S.-centric “status quo” 
through these documents therefore requires reading between the lines. Thus, firm 
conclusions based on information found in the DNSA’s archives are tough to make. 
Reading the DNSA documents alongside Alexander, Grandin and others can, 
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nonetheless, provide insight into the mayhem of the early years of the U.S.-Mexico “drug 
war.” 
Although Alexander’s argument that the “War on Drugs” is a means of 
maintaining racial hierarchy applies only to the United States, her analysis is still useful 
when thinking about Mexico. The documents treated in this thesis do not definitively say 
that the U.S.-Mexico “War on Drugs” is concerned with the perpetuation of a racial 
hierarchy. Even so, the U.S.-Mexico “drug war,” is indisputably an extension of the 
U.S.’s domestic quest to sustain a racialized social order. In turn, there is reason to 
believe that the “War on Drugs” performed a similar function vis-à-vis Mexico and its 
people. This is but one of many possible explanations for U.S. international drug 
enforcement, however.  
This thesis builds on Grandin’s argument that the U.S. used Mexico as a 
laboratory for developing drug enforcement tactics that were eventually implemented in 
the United States and elsewhere in Latin America. While the documentation is 
insufficient to allow an unequivocal argument for this case, evidence does point to this 
possibility. Grandin’s idea that the Cold War was a counter-revolution against the left in 
Latin America is not explicitly reflected in U.S. government documents, either. Even so, 
there is an anticommunist element of the U.S. documents. But if waging “war” on illegal 
substances was a permutation of Cold War, the “drug war” soon proved more than an 
effective disguise for anticommunist intervention. In Mexico’s case, it is feasible that the 
U.S. used the “drug war” to intervene in Mexican internal affairs and perpetuate a U.S.-
centric “status quo” without having to raise the issue of communism. If this was so, the 
“drug war” in Mexico can be seen as a smokescreen for U.S. anticommunist intervention 
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and as an independent “war” capable of perpetuating the U.S. “status quo” outside the 
structures of the Cold War. Again, this hypothesis cannot be presently taken as fact given 
that U.S. government documents from this period do not bear out this claim. 
Another important caveat: the research done for this thesis does not include 
Mexican government materials. The Mexican government’s perspective is, thus, notably 
absent. Further, DNSA declassified documents, as government sources, do not—and 
cannot—represent the people who were most affected by the U.S.-Mexico “drug war.” 
Despite the many limitations of the DNSA’s collections of declassified documents, 
looking at them in conjunction with secondary sources like Alexander, Grandin, and 
others is sufficient to construct an analytic frame with which one can begin to make sense 
of the U.S.-Mexico “War on Drugs” from the late 1960s to the late 1970s.  
Two U.S.-Mexico interactions of the period are especially relevant when 
attempting to understand the complicated nature of the “War on drugs,” its purposes, its 
successes, and its failures: Operation Intercept (1969) and Operation Condor (1975-
1978). Operation Intercept was, at the time, the largest peacetime search and seizure 
operation ever conducted;17 Operation Condor was the largest aerial drug eradication 
campaign in history.18 Both Operation Intercept and Operation Condor are riddled with 
contradictions and further complicated by the convergence of the three “wars” in which 
the U.S. and Mexico were involved. Yet complexities of Intercept and Condor serve to 
underscore their importance in the effort to decode the intractable early years of the U.S.-
Mexico “drug war.”  
                                                
17 Richard B Craig. "Operation Intercept: The International Politics of Pressure." (The 
Review of Politics 42.4, 1980), 564. 
18 Peter Watt, and Roberto Zepeda Martínez. Drug War Mexico: Politics, Neoliberalism 
and Violence in the New Narcoeconomy. (London: Zed, 2012), 50. 
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Chapter 1 discusses Operation Intercept, the context in which it occurred, and 
other events relevant to the earliest days of the U.S.-Mexico “drug war.” Chapter 2 
discusses Operation Condor as a seminal moment in the “War on Drugs,” but focuses 
more generally on the 1970s. One could argue that today’s world still bears the marks of 
Operation Intercept and Operation Condor. Even so, it is not within the scope of this 
thesis to conclude the meanings, consequences, and legacies of Operation Intercept, 
Operation Condor, or the first decade of the U.S.-Mexico “War on Drugs.” What is done 
is offer an in-depth analysis of the beginning of the U.S.-Mexico “drug war” and why the 




 The Southern “Southern Strategy”19 
The “Southern Strategy” and the “Mexican Problem” 
“In just four years—1964 to 1968—a [United States] that had been as united as 
never before fell apart, fragmented into polarized factions.”20 Richard Nixon inherited 
this fractious situation upon assuming the U.S.’s highest political office from Lyndon B. 
Johnson in January 1969. The late 1960s was a particularly charged political, social, and 
economic time for the U.S. The Civil Rights Movement, women’s movements, the sexual 
revolution, anti-war movements opposing the Cold and Vietnam wars, and various other 
countercultures were, in the eyes of conservatives, threatening to tear the United States 
asunder. U.S. industrial dominance, undisputed since World War II, was being 
challenged by Germany and Japan. The U.S. economy was slowing after 25 years of 
uninterrupted growth.21 The Cold and Vietnam wars were raging. For the first time since 
the end of World War II, it appeared that “America’s unchallenged supremacy in the 
world was no longer a given.”22 
The Republican Party and Nixon had no intention of unifying the disparate 
factions of the late 1960’s. Instead, the Republican Party developed the “Southern 
Strategy.” Wielding a rhetoric decrying a failing United States, the Republican Party 
                                                
19 The title of this chapter comes from a conversation I had with professor Carlos Alamo. 
The Southern “Southern Strategy” here refers to the Nixon White House’s policy of 
fomenting anti-African American racism and alludes to the possibility of a similar policy 
regarding Mexico and other Latin American nations. It is reflective of the U.S. 
government’s presumption that it has a right to play a role in Latin American politics and 
illustrative of the U.S.’s position in the world as a hegemonic monolith. 
20 William H. Chafe. The Rise and Fall of the American Century: United States from 
1890-2009. (New York: Oxford UP, 2009), 212. 
21 Ibid, 229. 
22 Ibid, 215. 
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united whites by blaming racial, political, and economic minorities for the country’s 
declining international status and domestic upheaval. Broadly, the “aim [of the “Southern 
Strategy” was to appeal to the fears and biases of…working-class whites, and thereby 
weaken their traditional support for Democratic candidates.”23 In particular, it played on 
the anti-black, pro-segregation bias of the southern U.S. that had been incensed by civil 
rights progress. On the surface, the “Southern Strategy” sought to garner white votes for 
the Republican Party through a politics of racial disunity. But, according to Alexander, 
the “Southern Strategy” was also one of the first steps in creating a new form of racial 
subjugation after the abolition of Jim Crow segregation laws.24 In short order, the 
“Southern Strategy” and “law and order” would mutate into the “War on Drugs” and 
mass incarceration—the institutions that replaced Jim Crow.   
The year before Nixon’s first election, “81 percent of those responding to the 
Gallup Poll agreed with the statement ‘law and order have broken down in [the U.S.]’ 
and the majority blamed ‘Negroes…and Communists.’”25 Nixon masterfully manipulated 
these sentiments, using the “Southern Strategy” and “law and order” to “turn middle-
Americans against hippies…antiwar protestors,”26 and racial minorities. “Law and order” 
rhetoric became the race-neutral language that replaced the explicitly racist discourse of 
Jim Crow.27 Coded anti-black rhetoric and racial polarization were the keys to the 
Republican Party’s new majority.28 The “Southern Strategy” and “law and order” gave 
                                                
23 Tonry, 2. 
24 Alexander, 44. 
25 Alexander, 46. 
26 Chafe, 218. 
27 Alexander, 40. 
28 Ibid., 45. 
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crime “a black face,”29 especially crimes involving drugs and street violence that could be 
selectively policed in African American communities.  
Alongside these anti-African American strategies, Nixon seems to have recycled 
the “Mexican Problem” narrative in his pursuit of racial disharmony. Nixon’s “Southern 
Strategy” didn’t deal with Mexico or its peoples explicitly. And in some respects, the 
“Southern Strategy” didn’t have to demonize Mexicans. Well before Nixon, U.S.-Mexico 
narratives had, according to Gilbert G. Gonzalez, “described [Mexicans] as inferior 
beings in comparison to Americans,” and Mexico as a “Land of Mañana,”30 comprised of 
a people afflicted by various defects threatening serious social problems for both Mexico 
and the United States. These nebulous defects became know as the “Mexican Problem,” 
which, it was thought, only the total Americanization of Mexico could solve.31  
In his paper "Mexico 'Under Siege': Drug Cartels Or U.S. Imperialism?" Alfredo 
Carlos shows how justification for the U.S. government’s “drug war” in Mexico was 
constructed along the line of the “Mexican Problem” “discourse [that] distorts and 
misrepresents [Mexico]. Its purpose…to provide justification for economic 
paternalism.”32 This thesis does not argue that economic paternalism was at the heart of 
the U.S.-Mexico “drug war” from the late 1960s to the late 1970s. Even so, Carlos’ basic 
argument that the U.S. consciously misrepresents Mexico to serve an American agenda is 
relevant to this treatment of the “War on Drugs.” U.S. conservatives from the late 1960s 
onwards pinned the inflow of illicit drugs on backward Mexican society. Their proposed 
                                                
29 Tonry, 10. 
30 Gilbert G. Gonzalez. Culture of Empire: American Writers, Mexico, and Mexican 
Immigrants, 1880-1930. (Austin: U of Texas, 2004), 9-10. 
31 Ibid., 9-10. 
32 Alfredo Carlos. "Mexico 'Under Siege': Drug Cartels Or U.S. Imperialism?" (Latin 
American Perspectives 41.2, 2014), 43.  
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solution was to intervene, exercise U.S. dominance, and force Mexico’s 
“Americanization.” 
While the “Southern Strategy” facilitated the criminalization of African 
Americans and the U.S. left, the “Mexican Problem” narrative appears to have allowed 
the Nixon government to blame U.S. drug use and addiction on Mexico. It is worth 
noting that, according to “Request for a Recommendation on the Heroin Problem,” 
Mexico was supplying 15% of the available heroin and 90% of the available marijuana in 
the United States circa 1969.33 The “Mexican Problem” narrative was recycled, however, 
to blame Mexican drug traffickers and producers for U.S. drug use, while subjecting 
white U.S. users to comparatively little scorn. The Nixon task force surmised, “only a 
massive, continuous effort [in Mexico and] directed by the highest officials of Mexico, 
[would] significantly curtail the production and refinement [of]…drugs.” 34 In accordance 
with the “Mexican Problem” narrative, the task recommended that drugs be dealt with at 
the source and not in the U.S., which consuming Mexican drugs.  
Attacking Mexican drug production appealed to Nixon’s constituency because 
such issues posed no threat to Nixon’s political base.35 Statistically, constituents of 
Nixon’s white majority were just as likely as any person of a minority population to do 
and sell drugs. “People of all races use and sell illegal drugs at remarkably similar 
rates…[and studies] frequently suggest that whites, particularly white youth, are more 
likely to engage in illegal drug dealing than people of color.”36 But rates of drug use 
                                                
33 United States Department of Justice. “Request for a Recommendation on the Heroin 
Problem.” 1969. (Digital National Security Archive), 4. 
34 Ibid, 35.  
35 Tonry, 10. 
36 Alexander, 99. 
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among the races were irrelevant to the framers of the “drug war.” In fact, when marijuana 
laws began to negatively affect white U.S. consumers during Nixon’s presidency, many 
states moved to lighten the penalties for drug infractions as to not harm their white 
political power.37 Nixon’s constituency had nothing to fear from attacking Mexican drug 
producing and smuggling because remedying drug-related crime was truthfully more 
about demonizing African Americans, Mexicans, and other minorities than ridding the 
U.S. of drugs. So as much as U.S.-Mexico counternarcotics efforts at this time might 
have been interested in slowing the flow of drugs into the U.S., they can also be viewed 
as an extension of the U.S.’s “Southern Strategy.” Nixon’s first action in the “War on 
Drugs,” Operation Intercept, substantiates this claim.  
Operation Intercept: The First Shot in the “War on Drugs” 
 
During his first year in office, President Nixon shut down the U.S.-Mexico border 
for 19 days in September-October 1969. Beginning September 21, Nixon’s directive, 
dubbed Operation Intercept, strove to confiscate large quantities of drugs being smuggled 
into the United States by searching every possible person, car, boat, and plane crossing 
the border. It was the largest peacetime civilian search and seizure campaign in U.S. 
history.38 Nixon, annoyed with what he perceived to be the Mexican government’s failure 
to adequately move against drugs on its side of the border, was prepared to take drastic 
measures. “This time Mexican officials [were to see] the lengths to which the U.S. Justice 
and Treasury Departments [were] willing to go to cripple the marijuana trade.”39  
                                                
37 Tonry, 10. 
38 Craig, 564. 
39 Ibid., 565.  
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Around 2,000 people and $30 million were directed to the task of executing 
Operation Intercept. Tijuana was declared off limits to U.S. servicemen and women. 23 
radar installations between San Diego and El Paso conducted surveillance on 
unregistered flights suspected of carrying drugs, and coordinated U.S. Customs Service 
aircraft in pursuit. High-speed planes patrolled the skies, and boats patrolled the coasts. In 
the end, more than 4.5 million people, their belongings, and vehicles were searched for 
drugs. Of the millions of border crossers inspected, almost 2,000 were subject to further 
investigation, with some being forced to submit to a strip search.40  
Although many Americans living on or near the border suffered from the punitive 
ineptitude of Operation Intercept, Mexicans bore the brunt of the shutdown. Furthermore, 
Operation Intercept rearticulated the “Mexican Problem” by criminalizing the Mexican 
people. Intercept accused the Mexican population, en masse, of being drug traffickers and 
smugglers. In fact, Nixon’s directive was far more effective in demonizing Mexico than 
intercepting drugs. The quantity of drugs seized in Operation Intercept was negligible, 
and it did not succeed in crippling the marijuana trade as Nixon had hoped. In addition to 
the national injustices that resulted from Operation Intercept, Mexicans trying to cross the 
border in September-October 1969 were subjected to systemic racial profiling. In this 
light, Operation Intercept can be viewed within Alexander’s argument that the “War on 
Drugs” is a racially motivated perpetuation of the white U.S. “status quo.”  Although her 
analysis concerning the racial profiling of African Americans begins in the 1980s and 
does not examine the racial profiling of Mexicans and Mexican Americans in the late 
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1960s, her discussion of the relationship between racial profiling and the “War on Drugs” 
is a good starting point for studying the latter.   
Operation Intercept: Social Control and Racial Profiling  
While Michelle Alexander maintains that Ronald Reagan launched the “War on 
Drugs” in the United States in 1982,41 one could argue that it began earlier, with 
Operation Intercept. Why might this disparity matter? Greg Grandin’s conception of 
Latin America as a workshop for American empire is particularly resonant when 
examining how Nixon decided to start his antidrug crusade. Suggesting that the “War on 
Drugs” began in 1982 ignores the importance of preceding U.S. antidrug policies. On the 
other hand, acknowledging that the “drug war” began in the 1960s recognizes the critical 
role Mexico has played in the evolution of U.S. drug enforcement.  
In 1984, the DEA launched Operation Pipeline: “The federal program, 
administered by over three hundred state and local law enforcement agencies, 
[trained]…law enforcement officers to use pretextual traffic stops…on a large scale for 
drug interdiction.”42 Operation Pipeline encouraged law enforcement to stop “those who 
belonged to disfavored groups”43 by assuming that members of these groups were 
potentially drug couriers. However, using “pretextual” traffic stops as a means to seize 
drugs on a massive scale on American motorways was not new in 1984. One only has to 
look back to 1969 to see that the prototype for Operation Pipeline could have been 
Operation Intercept.  
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As part of Operation Pipeline, the DEA created “drug-courier profiles” that 
Alexander argues were notoriously broad, unreliable, and disproportionately affected 
minorities.44 The June 1969 “Task Force Report: Narcotics, Marijuana and Dangerous 
Drugs” indicates that drug-courier profiling was already established policy. The task 
force suggested that to expedite the seizure of drugs, “case histories of past and future 
smugglers should be analyzed to determine identifiable characteristic patterns of 
smugglers to facilitate primary inspection at the border.”45 “Task Force Report: 
Narcotics, Marijuana and Dangerous Drugs” further states, “[immigrants and aliens are] 
inadmissible [to the United States] if the Immigration officer knows or has reason to 
believe such aliens have been traffickers in narcotic drugs.”46  
The document does not define “identifiable characteristic patterns” or what would 
constitute a reason to believe that someone had been a narcotics trafficker. However, the 
report mentions a program through which the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs 
(BNDD) and the Bureau of Customs would furnish narcotics information to the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service. One could infer that immigration officers would 
have had access to drug crime information that they could use to suspect someone of 
being a trafficker or smuggler. The report, however, does not say this outright, and the 
program is mentioned only once, and is not treated at length.  
Despite the vagueness of the references, Operation Intercept may still be 
understood as an experiment in mass drug-courier profiling, and one that depicted the 
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Mexican nation as populated with drug traffickers. According to the “Task Force Report: 
Narcotics, Marijuana and Dangerous Drugs,”  
Most of the marihuana [sic] in the United States today comes from Mexico and is 
smuggled across the border by various means. Mexico has become by far [the 
U.S.’s] largest supplier of marihuana and it is also the source of a substantial 
quantity of other drugs. As the primary source of supply, free-lance smugglers 
and organized traffickers are largely responsible for the marihuana and drug abuse 
problem.47  
 
Blaming Mexican smugglers exclusively for the perceived U.S. drug problem in the late 
1960s was, of course, erroneous. Smugglers were supplying an endless demand for drugs 
in the U.S. “Task Force Report: Narcotics, Marijuana and Dangerous Drugs” mentions 
this insatiable demand saying, “the consumption in the United States of drugs…has 
reached such proportion…as to be in the highest rank of those matters affecting the vital 
interests of the nation.”48 Even so, it is Mexico and not the United States that is blamed. 
Admitting the U.S. was consuming drugs willingly would undercut the “War on Drug’s” 
power of negative racialization.  
It is possible that Operation Intercept was the antecedent of U.S. mass racial 
profiling in the U.S. throughout the 1980s—the decade during which the domestic “drug 
war” gained steam. However, there is no hard evidence in the documents examined for 
this thesis that conclusively identifies a lineage between Operation Intercept and 
Operation Pipeline. Even so, the two are similar insofar as both sought to seize drugs 
primarily by using traffic stops. More than a decade before Operation Pipeline menaced 
American minorities, Operation Intercept menaced Mexican citizens and Mexican 
Americans, groups that were ethnic, racial, and economic minorities. If there were a 
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relationship between these two operations, that link would suggest, as Grandin does, that 
Mexico is part of the Latin American “workshop” of American empire. Thus, the U.S.-
Mexico border and Operation Intercept could be viewed as a laboratory in which the U.S. 
government tested protocols for and the efficacy of racial profiling. Further, Operation 
Intercept appears to have functioned as a mechanism to preserve and perpetuate the 
U.S.’s racial hierarchy, one in which brown and black peoples remain at the bottom.  
This perceived objective of Operation Intercept parallels John Ehrlichman’s 
admission that the “War on Drugs” was a means to criminalize and oppress marginal 
components of the American racial, political, and economic landscape. Operation 
Intercept, however, cannot be seen exclusively as an experiment in racial profiling. It 
must also be viewed within the context of the Cold War due to the U.S.’s anticommunist 
agenda and its obsession with maintaining a pro-capitalist role in Latin American politics. 
Although clear conclusions regarding the interrelationship of the Cold War, “drug war,” 
and Operation Intercept are difficult to establish, there is some connection between the 
three. To what extent they’re connected can only be partially understood through the 
declassified documents examined in this thesis. Even so, there is evidence that suggests 
Operation Intercept was part of an anticommunist agenda. 
Cold War Complications 
Although U.S. government sources often define the purpose of the U.S-Mexico 
“drug war” and Operation Intercept as “[furthering] the elimination of…illicit 
narcotics…[in] Mexico and the U.S,”49 this definition is difficult to take at face value. 
Further obscuring the purpose of the “drug war” the U.S. government ambiguously 
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claimed its general objective in Mexico was “not so much to change an unsatisfactory 
situation or to reverse adverse trends but rather to ensure that a generally favorable 
situation [continued] to evolve in a favorable way.”50 The “Country Analysis and 
Strategy Papers for Mexico” outline four key U.S. interests somewhat more specifically: 
“Preservation of U.S. national security…Promotion of common economic 
interests…Strengthening of special bi-lateral relationships…[and]…a more helpful 
Mexican international role.”51  
All four key interests outlined by the “Country Analysis and Strategy Papers for 
Mexico” could conceivably relate to the Cold War, especially “a more helpful Mexican 
international role.” For the U.S. government, this “helpful role” meant “the subordination 
of Mexican foreign policy to domestic [U.S.] considerations…[in recognition] that 
Mexican interests may…diverge from [those of the U.S.].”52 Indeed, the Nixon 
administration had surmised that “the consumption in the United States of drugs and 
narcotics produced abroad and illegally imported into [the] country [had] reached such 
proportion as to rank highest of those matters affecting the vital interests of [the U.S.].”53 
But given the U.S. government’s amorphous and broadly defined aims, it could be argued 
that it viewed Mexico’s social and economic stability as issues of comparable importance 
to that of drugs. These issues were important, as Mexico was beset by social instability 
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and economic downturn in the late 1960s. Furthermore, these were problems that had the 
potential to foment the kind of communist subversion that the U.S. government feared. 
According to some sources, this fear was well founded. 
In 1969, Nixon commissioned the governor of New York Nelson A. Rockefeller 
to go to Latin America and report on its state of affairs. His travels resulted in The 
Rockefeller Report on the Americas, which warned Nixon that “the hemisphere [was] 
again in the throes of violent political, economic, and social convulsions, 
which…[threatened] ‘more Castros’ in Latin America.”54 The report stressed the 
necessary interdependence of Western Hemisphere nations in the fight against communist 
insurgency and subversion. It advised Nixon to refrain from economic and political 
paternalism, and to avoid the American tendency toward isolationist behavior.55 Nixon, in 
Rockefeller’s words, needed “to decide how [U.S.] interests [were] affected abroad by 
insurgency and subversion elsewhere in the hemisphere and the extent to which [U.S.] 
programs [could] and should assist in meeting the security requirements of its 
neighbors.”56 Given the context of Rockefeller’s concern about Latin American nations 
turning left, a more helpful Mexican international role could be construed as the U.S.’s 
desire for Mexico to take an anticommunist, pro-U.S.-capitalistic stance.  
Having the Mexican government as an ally in the Cold War was doubtlessly 
important for the U.S., especially when considering the state of Mexican political affairs 
at the end of the 1960s. Evidence suggests that Mexico at that time was experiencing 
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what Rockefeller might call social convulsions. The Mexican middle and working classes 
had lost faith in the authoritarian PRI,57 as “structural…crisis generated widespread 
discontent, and citizens across the political spectrum began to protest.”58 Meanwhile, the 
period of unparalleled economic growth known as the “Mexican Miracle” was slowing 
down; and it had only been a miracle for some. The “Mexican Miracle” created, 
according to Mexican intellectual Octavio Paz, “two Mexicos, one modern and the other 
underdeveloped—poorly clothed, illiterate, and underfed.”59  
The United States recognized that Mexico had economic problems. It did not, 
however, believe these problems to be of immediate concern, perhaps because the 
Mexican government appeared to being doing just enough to alleviate the country’s 
social ills. According to a U.S. government source,  
The chronic ‘poverty problem’ [in Mexico] of widespread subsistence living in 
the backward ‘traditional sector’… could produce local political explosions and 
even national repercussions if exploited by extremists. The problem is being 
attacked through a continuing land redistribution program, through 
industrialization in urban areas, and through programs aimed at improving 
agricultural productivity. Even so, about one half of the entrants into the labor 
force each year cannot find employment in the ‘modern’ sector.60 
 
Land redistribution and industrialization, however, did not prevent political upheaval. 
Mexico had already experienced a national political explosion. Less than a year before 
the launch of Operation Intercept the Tlatelolco Massacre had rocked Mexico to its core.  
On October 2, 1968, the Mexican government, with the help of the army and 
paramilitary units, murdered a still-unknown number of students at the Tlatelolco Plaza 
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in Mexico City. Unfortunately, the Tlatelolco Massacre was not the last time the Mexican 
government would kill students and other dissidents. Throughout the late 1960s and into 
the mid 1970s, Mexican presidents Gustavo Díaz Ordaz and Luis Echeverría Álvarez 
waged a clandestine “Dirty War” against the Mexican people, of which the U.S. was 
aware.61 Like the Cold War, Mexico’s “Dirty War” is another conflict that complicates a 
simple analysis of the “War on Drugs.” Mexico, according to Kate Doyle, had a vested 
interest in suppressing rebellious elements of its population, both rural and urban.62 But 
although the Cold War and Mexico’s “Dirty War” were both anti-left, they must be 
treated as separate conflicts. 
During its “Dirty War,” the Mexican government was quick to blame communist 
radicals and extremists for inciting violence. Like the Mexican state, the U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency gathered information on the Mexican people, especially on leftist 
student-activists with possible communist ties. In trying to make sense of the Tlatelolco 
Massacre, a CIA cable admits “[that] communists are always plausible and tempting 
targets [to blame], since they stand to benefit from and have been involved with the 
[student] disturbances.”63 American agencies operating in Mexico (like the Defense 
Department, the CIA, the FBI, and the U.S. Embassy) initially believed the Mexican 
government’s stance: that communists were to blame for the massacre. But as more 
information came to light incriminating the Mexican government, the U.S. distanced 
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itself from the PRI’s claim.64 In any case, the U.S.’s willingness to pin the massacre on 
communist instigators is illustrative of its paralyzing fear of communism. But in the 
midst of the confusion caused by the Tlatelolco Massacre, it’s possible to see how the 
U.S. could have been misled by the Mexican state.  
That Mexico was experiencing the “highest degree of student unrest”65 in Latin 
America made U.S. government uneasy. As a U.S. government source noted, “the 
October incident did considerable damage to Mexico’s reputation as the most stable and 
progressive country in Latin America.”66 Of further concern to the U.S. was how 
“Mexico’s unique political system, which was so effective in governing a backwards 
society and which brought prosperity and education to so many, [was] being outgrown by 
and increasingly sophisticated, articulate public.”67 A CIA cable clarifies, “it [was] 
apparent that the ‘status quo’ which existed prior [to the Tlatelolco Massacre]…[had] 
been changed and…[would] have long lasting effects on the Mexican scene.”68 The cable 
goes on to describe the waning power of the PRI. “[The Tlatelolco massacre] has shown 
that the [Mexican] government and the National Revolutionary Party (PRI) do not 
possess the power and near total control over public behavior which existed previously. 
The old order [was] passing.”69 And “For many U.S. analysts, [this] suggested the 
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troubling possibility that impoverished Mexicans were waking up to the oppressive bonds 
of a stultified one-party system that no longer offered hope for change.”70  
Despite evidence that suggests a deep-seated U.S. fear of the Mexican people and 
dread of a potential Mexican political explosion, some U.S. sources held Mexico in high 
esteem. Throughout the Cold War, the United States stood behind Latin American 
regimes that could militate against the spread of communism. It was an era in which 
“Washington found that it greatly preferred anti-communist dictatorships [in Latin 
America] to the possibility that democratic openness might allow the Soviets to gain a 
foothold on the continent.”71 Mexico, at least in part, met these criteria. A 1969 American 
University study endorsed “[Mexico’s] recent history of relative prosperity and security 
[that had] gone far in creating an environment of general satisfaction.”72 The study 
viewed a strong late-1960s Mexican economy as an impediment to any potential 
communist subversion.73 The veracity of this sentiment is debatable. It is possible the 
American University study was a reflection of the U.S. government’s faith in the PRI.  
There was some reason for the U.S. to believe in Mexico’s ruling party. Although 
the Mexican government was publicly sympathetic to the communist government of 
Cuba, it aligned favorably with Washington’s anti-communist position behind closed 
doors.74 In a 1970 conversation with Nixon in Washington D.C., Luis Echeverría  
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spent much of his time discussing communism’s threat to the region. Latin 
America was in imminent danger, he told Nixon, beset by poverty and 
unemployment and bombarded by Soviet propaganda touting Fidel Castro’s Cuba 
as the answer to the hemisphere’s problems. The solution, [Echeverría] insisted, 
was private capital. Echeverría urged Nixon to promote American business 
investments in Mexico and [Latin America].75 
 
Given the above transcription, it’s understandable that the United States was convinced 
“[Mexico posed] no immediate threat to U.S. security interests…[nor foresaw] any 
change in [Mexican] relations with…Communist countries such as would [have posed] 
serious…threats to U.S. security interests.”76 What is one to believe in the face of these 
inconsistencies? Was Mexico stable, or was it a potential hotbed of communist 
insurrection? Furthermore, how do the “War on Drugs” and Operation Intercept fit into a 
discussion of the Cold War? Although examining Operation Intercept cannot fully 
explain the U.S. government’s views, it is a good place to start when trying to link the 
Cold War and the “War on Drugs.”  
Circumventing the Cold War 
Nixon was “determined to prove he could establish law and order in a [United 
States] that seemed to be spinning out of control.”77 For him, restoring “law and order” 
domestically meant, in part, stopping the flow of Mexican drugs through Operation 
Intercept. Richard B. Craig challenges Nixon’s presumption by describing Operation 
Intercept’s purpose as “not to interdict drugs at the border, but to pressure Mexico 
through economic denial…[by seeking] a politically expedient solution to…domestic 
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drug abuse.”78 The U.S. Department of State appears to substantiate Craig’s point of view 
in the document “Operation Intercept Under Way” saying “[Operation Intercept 
infringed] on Mexican sovereignty [and was] an effort to blackmail Mexico to take 
stronger measures against what is…a U.S. problem.”79 But G. Gordon Liddy obfuscates 
the goal of the operation calling “[Operation Intercept] an exercise in international 
extortion, pure, simple, and effective, designed to bend Mexico to [the U.S.’s] will.”80 
In their paper “A Trojan Horse: Anti-communism and the War on Drugs,” 
Bullington and Block propose that drugs provided a disguise for U.S. anti-communist 
intervention.81 They conclude, though, that U.S. “relations with apparently friendly anti-
communist governments [would] never be sacrificed for drug control.”82 In some 
instances, Bullington and Block’s argument parallels that of the U.S. government. For 
example, the “alarming increase in the sale and consumption of [Mexican] marijuana in 
the United States”83 seems not to have shaken U.S. faith in its anti-communist alliance 
with Mexico. Nevertheless, Washington regularly jeopardized its relationship with its 
anti-communist southern neighbor over drugs, which contradicts Bullington and Block’s 
conclusion. 
Operation Intercept is a chief example of this contradiction. With it, the U.S. 
sacrificed relations with a friendly anti-communist Mexican government to pursue its 
“War on Drugs” agenda. So what exactly was the U.S. trying to accomplish with 
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Operation Intercept? Craig and the U.S. Department of State acknowledge that Operation 
Intercept unduly pressured Mexico economically and infringed on the nation’s 
sovereignty in an attempt to curb U.S. drug use. But, as the evidence provided attempts to 
show, understanding Operation Intercept as purely a measure of drug control is reductive. 
Though drug control was one of the U.S. government’s highest priorities at the start of 
Nixon’s presidency, drug control was not its only priority.  
Because of the U.S.’s fervent hatred of communism and fear of communist 
penetration in Latin America, it might be possible to analyze Operation Intercept as a 
counter-revolutionary construct of the Cold War. To do so involves examining how the 
U.S. used Operation Intercept as a means to formalize an American police presence in 
Mexico. In cooperating with the United States in the wake of Operation Intercept, 
Mexico agreed to undertake large-scale antidrug efforts and to permit U.S. drug 
enforcement agents in Mexico. Agents from the BNDD were henceforth authorized to 
gather intelligence on drug trafficking and conduct surveillance on marijuana and poppy 
fields in Mexico.84 Not long after Operation Intercept, U.S. drug enforcement agents 
would even come to play a participatory role in Mexican counternarcotics efforts. 
The desire to have U.S. law enforcement agencies and agents abroad mirrors The 
Rockefeller Report. Rockefeller perceived many Latin America nations as unable to 
protect their internal security. This inability, he believed, was in part the fault of each 
country’s police force. In his report, Rockefeller notes, “[police forces in the western 
hemisphere] have become increasingly less capable of providing either the essential 
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psychological support or the internal security that is their major function.”85 He goes on 
to add: “no one country today can effectively protect its own internal security by itself.”86 
Although Rockefeller’s report doesn’t call for outright U.S. intervention in Latin 
American police forces, his beliefs could imply a willingness to do so. Nixon appears not 
to have heeded Rockefeller’s advice to refrain from economic paternalism or isolationist 
behavior in the Western Hemisphere. It appears, though, that Nixon took Rockefeller’s 
concerns about Latin America’s ability to police itself seriously. 
Part of the U.S. government’s post-Operation Intercept strategy in Mexico was to 
develop and expand on “a Military Assistance Program…directed toward the 
development of a small but highly professional armed force adequately trained and 
equipped to meet its responsibilities for the maintenance of internal security.”87 
Unfortunately, “F.Y. 1972 Country Analysis and Strategy Paper for Mexico” does not go 
on to clarify what the maintenance of Mexican internal security might entail, or if this 
meant drug control or included social control. Given the concerns of the Cold War and 
Mexico’s “Dirty War,” this allusion to internal security might have meant the suppression 
of the Mexican left and other dissident elements within the country.  
Perhaps it was because of Mexico’s role as an anticommunist ally that the United 
States needed to use Operation Intercept as a means to intervene in Mexican policing. 
U.S. government documents do not explicitly state that the U.S. used the “drug war” and 
Operation Intercept as tactics to circumvent traditional Cold War intervention as a means 
of infiltrating Mexican internal affairs. But the fact remains that one of Intercept’s most 
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notable outcomes was to allow the permanent presence of American law enforcement 
agents in a foreign, sovereign nation.  
Saying that Operation Intercept’s sole purpose was to legalize a U.S. law 
enforcement presence in Mexico is a stretch. But given the presence of the BNDD in 
Mexico after Intercept and that Mexico was politically unstable at the time, the U.S.-
Mexico “drug war” could be viewed as having counter-revolutionary intent. Even if 
Operation Intercept was in no way a counter-revolutionary construct of the Cold War, 
there is still validity in the claim that the U.S. used Mexico as a workshop in which the 
U.S. experimented with ways to preserve and perpetuate its “status quo.”  
David H. Bayley argues that in the post-Cold War world, the perception of police 
forces changed from “a necessary evil [to]…co-producers of a desirable political 
order…[and] a key component of social stability and economic development.”88 In his 
argument, Bayley contends that the United States began intervening in and modeling 
foreign police forces after its own in the 1980s and early 1990s. But U.S. behavior 
towards Mexico in the late 1960s shows that the U.S. interest in and practice of 
intervening in foreign policing predates 1980s policy. “The core,” says María Celia Toro, 
“of the United States-Mexico [antinarcotics] program…was the training of a special 
antinarcotics unit in Mexico, following the DEA model.”89 Toro goes on to argue that the 
DEA has often been the guiding force in Mexican antidrug policy.90 
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But post-Operation Intercept, the DEA model hadn’t yet been solidified. When 
the presence of U.S. drug enforcement personnel in Mexico became permanent in 1969, 
the DEA was still the BNDD. According to Alexander, the DEA was instrumental in the 
escalation of the “drug war” as a method of social control in the U.S in the 1980s.91 But 
before the department became the DEA, the BNDD was instrumental in the escalation of 
the U.S.-Mexico “drug war.” This chronology, like others analyzed in this thesis, 
suggests that Mexico was a testing ground for the U.S. government’s drug-control agenda 
and for the maintenance of its “status quo.” By establishing a permanent U.S. drug 
enforcement presence in Mexico, Operation Intercept may have opened the door to large-
scale drug eradication. This strategy would become the U.S.’s go-to method of drug 
control not only in Mexico, but around the world. 
Drug Eradication: The Beginning of “Drug War” Militarization  
“The Department of State…[gave] no subject higher priority…than to realize an 
eradication…in Mexico of opium poppies and marijuana…Only a massive and 
continuous effort…[it was believed, could] significantly curtail the production and 
refinement of marijuana and other dangerous drugs.”92 Richard Kleindienst, U.S. 
Attorney General under Nixon, believed “crop eradication was the essential element in 
stopping drug traffic.”93 But to get drug source countries like Mexico to undertake 
eradication campaigns, the U.S. needed “a specific threat to hold over the [drug 
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producing] nations, or at least hold behind [the U.S.’s] back.”94 Others in the Nixon 
White House agreed. In a candid moment, a White House memorandum says “that the 
Mexican government [should] be forced into a program of defoliation of marijuana plants 
(using borrowed or leased equipment from the United States) by commencing a campaign 
of strict enforcement and customs enforcement [sic] at the border.”95 Although 
government documents don’t clarify what the specific threat should be, it’s probable that 
the threat was Operation Intercept. The threat worked. With Mexico as its Guinea pig, the 
U.S. government proved that it could use economic intimidation to further its drug 
agenda in the hemisphere. With no other option but to meet the U.S.’s demands, “Mexico 
stated its purpose to continue intensifying…enforcement programs against the illicit 
traffic”96 and to start conducting large-scale drug eradication campaigns.  
Predictably, the U.S. government believed that an “intensified Mexican effort 
would be greatly aided by [the] U.S….[and that the U.S. should] express [its] willingness 
to make funds available…if [the request was] made by Mexicans.”97 It is unclear, 
however, if Mexico had the option to refuse assistance. If the U.S. government was 
willing to shut down the border indefinitely to prove a point about drugs, it’s possible that 
the U.S. did not need Mexico to request counternarcotics aid. Mexican president Gustavo 
Diaz Ordaz blamed the Mexican government’s perceived inability to combat drugs on a 
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lack of sufficient equipment.98 In doing so, he seems to have indicated an interest in 
obtaining U.S. assistance for the “drug war.”  
The U.S. was quick to provide Mexico with drug enforcement funding following 
Operation Intercept and allocated $1 million for chemical drug eradication experiments, 
remote detection equipment for locating marijuana and poppy fields, three observation 
planes, three helicopters outfitted to spray defoliants on crops, and training for pilots.99 
According to a U.S. document titled “Narcotics Assistance for Mexico,” the purpose of 
the $1 million was to “provide training and technical assistance in the specialized area of 
detection, eradication, equipment maintenance, and such other fields related to the 
elimination and control of narcotics, marijuana, and dangerous drugs as both countries 
deem necessary.”100 Additionally, Mexico was to use the U.S. equipment for “aerial 
photography, defoliant spraying, aerial search, border and [drug] route surveillance, 
inspection of crops, enforcement, and [drug crop] destruction parties.”101 Considering the 
equipment that the U.S gave Mexico in the aftermath of Operation Intercept, this period, 
and not the 1980s, could be viewed as the beginning of the militarization of the “War on 
Drugs.” 
At least one organization within the U.S. government foresaw some of the 
problems the militarization of the U.S.-Mexico “drug war” could cause. Voices 
condemning Operation Intercept were few in the U.S. government materials examined for 
this thesis. The Budget Bureau, however, did articulate some concern. Although the 
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document “Budget Bureau Comments on Marijuana Policy” did not predict the full 
effects or consequences of Operation Intercept, drug eradication, or militarization, it did 
suggest that Nixon’s “policy in [the marijuana] area may have more political costs than 
benefits.”102 Importantly, the Budget Bureau valued the Mexican marijuana crop to be 
more than $100 million. The Budget Bureau contended that marijuana in Mexico “may 
[have been] up to 40 times the value of any alternative crop [to individual farmers]. [And 
that] this [would provide] substantial incentive for large scale [sic] resistance”103 if the 
U.S. or Mexican governments were to move against the source of drugs, as Nixon 
desired. Despite the potential for resistance, source-country drug crop eradication was 
Washington gospel. This may have been because drug eradication was an effective way 
to oppress marginal elements of Mexican society, to disguise the Cold War, and to 
perpetuate the U.S. “status quo.” And the 1970s were the heyday of drug eradication in 
Mexico. Maybe this is why the they were considered the golden age of the U.S.-Mexico 
“War on Drugs.”  
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The Golden Age of the U.S-Mexico “War on Drugs” 
Money, Guns, and the Mexican “Dirty War” 
The narcotics epidemic that was ravaging the U.S. in the 1970s might have been 
more myth than reality. According to Christian Parenti, “evidence of a national narcotics 
siege did not exist.”104 In any case, it was a decade in which the U.S. public perceived 
drugs to be tearing at the fabric of the nation. For some it appeared that “America was 
under attack [by drugs], [and that] even its war crimes (referring to the My Lai Massacre) 
[were]…animated by heroin and weed.”105 Even though narcotic use may not have been 
on the rise, manufactured drug hysteria was an effective way to unite white, conservative 
American voters and spur government spending. The Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act of 1970 granted $189 million for treatment programs and 
another $220 million for drug enforcement.106 The BNDD grew by 300 agents that same 
year, some of whom were tasked with the drug enforcement and eradication training of 
Mexican law enforcement. 107 The U.S. was also providing Mexico with the necessary 
money and materiel to wage “war” on drugs.  
The “War on Drugs” in Mexico militarized rapidly. In 1972 alone the U.S. gave 
Mexico $1.3 million worth of equipment, including helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, 
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portable radios, small arms, and ammunition.108 In addition to this aid, a 1971 U.S. 
Embassy source documents a Mexican government request for over $3 million in military 
technology and arms. The memorandum states that the Mexican government was asking 
for “a lot of firepower.”109 Whether the arms in question made it to Mexico is uncertain. 
Also uncertain is whether or not the Mexican government planned to use the requested 
military assistance exclusively for drug enforcement. The fact remains that, at the time, 
the Mexican state was waging a “Dirty War” against leftists and dissidents. Despite the 
absence of evidence detailing the eventual use of the arms, the Mexican government’s 
request for “a lot of fire power” within the context of the “Dirty War” could lead to some 
speculation that the aid could have been destined for repressive acts of state violence.  
Luis Echeverría inherited the Mexican presidency and the “Dirty War” from 
Gustavo Diaz Ordaz in 1970. During his presidency, Echeverría proved as quick to 
violently repress leftists and dissidents as he had during his time as a member of Diaz 
Ordaz’s cabinet. Although the “Dirty War” didn’t necessarily begin during Echeverría’s 
term, his presidency largely spanned the worst years of the violent state repression.110 
Mexico’s military was in disrepair during what the United States government might have 
called a Mexican internal security crisis. Its equipment was outdated and rusting, and 
soldier morale was abysmal due to poor pay and a low standing in society.111 Doyle states 
that some U.S. analysts believed “Echeverría [ought] to give the [Mexican] military more 
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resources and freedom to operate”112 to restore its social standing. She goes on to argue 
that this is what Echeverría did in an effort to “tamp down military dissatisfaction by 
giving the army and the security forces carte blanche to attack the left.”113  
Is it possible that the U.S. provided arms and training to Mexican security forces 
under the cover of the “drug war” as a means to anti-leftist ends? Finding a connection 
between the suppression of the Mexican left during the “Dirty War” and the “War on 
Drugs” would be a major windfall, as such a link would definitively corroborate the 
hypothesis that the “War on Drugs” was a counter-revolutionary ploy. But it is a tenuous 
assumption at best because the U.S. government documents studied for this thesis do not 
bear out such a link. If there is a connection between the “War on Drugs” and the “Dirty 
War,” though, perhaps it can be fleshed out by examining some of the changes that U.S. 
foreign aid policy underwent during Echeverría’s presidency. U.S. agencies and 
structures that had been created to assist the police forces and militaries of foreign 
countries were failing. On top of that, it seems likely that U.S. international drug 
enforcement replaced these agencies and structures. This is most observable in the 
dissolution of the U.S. Office of Public Safety (OPS) and the ascent of the DEA. 
John Fitzgerald Kennedy founded the OPS in 1962 as an organization responsible 
for, among other things, providing police aid to foreign countries.114 “During its twelve 
year existence, [OPS] provided aid to police agencies in approximately fifty Third World 
nations [including Mexico], spending more than $300 million on training, weaponry, and 
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telecommunications.”115 Unfortunately, the OPS’s effects on foreign police forces were 
often catastrophic. Law enforcement agencies outside of the U.S. trained and aided by the 
OPS were regularly found to be corrupt and to engage in the torture and murder of 
civilians. Operation Phoenix in Vietnam, infamously funded by the OPS, was a program 
that tortured and killed suspected Viet Cong members. Within the Western Hemisphere, 
the OPS funded and trained notorious Guatemalan police forces that participated in the 
brutal oppression of that nation’s people.116  
The OPS was dissolved amidst allegations of torture, murder, and espionage in 
1974. But, in many ways, the OPS simply became the DEA, which was founded in 1973 
as the successor of the BNDD. In fact, when the OPS shut its doors, many of its officers 
became DEA agents. Even in its earliest days the DEA was training more than 2,000 
foreign police officials a year.117 During Nixon’s tenure, the BNDD/DEA’s international 
presence skyrocketed from 24 agents to more than 200.118 Furthermore, “a foreign police 
agency interested in obtaining U.S. training and funds for equipment had little chance of 
success if it could not establish some connection with drug enforcement.”  
This is curious when considering the U.S. “War on Drugs” in the 1980s. 
According to Alexander, the Byrne Program, instituted in 1988, “was designed to 
encourage every [U.S.] federal grant recipient to help fight the War on Drugs…[and] 
resulted in the proliferation of narcotics tasks forces.”119 In deciding that drug 
enforcement was the issue it wanted to police, Washington created financial incentives to 
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assure that police agencies across the nation fought in the “drug war.” As many police 
agencies needed federal money, they had little choice but to enforce the U.S. federal 
government’s drug agenda. But the practice of financially incentivizing the “drug war” 
appears to predate the Byrne program. As Ethan A. Nadelman points out, this was 
something the U.S. did in Latin American countries in the 1970s. In this case, nations like 
Mexico could have provided a testing ground for how the U.S. achieved nationwide and 
international drug enforcement. Although the link between the Byrne Program and U.S. 
financial incentives for the “drug war” in Latin America is shaky, it does not negate the 
U.S.’s success in getting western hemisphere nations to participate in the “War on 
Drugs.” In fact, it seems that instead of dying with the OPS, the U.S.’s international 
policing regime flourished under DEA supervision. Within a year of its foundation, the 
DEA was the most powerful counternarcotics agency on the planet and the most active 
and powerful force in the U.S.-Mexico “drug war.” 
Despite evidence that the DEA was, in part, the offspring of the dubious OPS, 
there is no outright connection to be seen in U.S. declassified documents between the 
DEA’s behavior in Mexico and the oppressive actions of its predecessor. In addition, 
U.S. government sources plainly state that “Under no circumstances [was] a DEA agent 
[operating in Mexico to] be party to the abuse, torture or other denial of human rights of 
any prisoner, Mexican or American; should such action occur, the DEA agent [was] to 
withdraw from the premises immediately.”120 But the origin of the DEA should give one 
pause when considering its preeminent position in the U.S.-Mexico “drug war.” As 
journalist Craig Pyes observes, “there is no [definitive] link between training and 
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torture.”121 Pyes, however, adds, “American [DEA] agents stood by without protest 
during the torture and execution of Mexican nationals at the hands of Mexican 
personnel.”122 He even contends that DEA agents may have been involved in the torture 
of drug suspects themselves.123 Furthermore, Peter Watt and Roberto Zapeda suggest that 
“In Mexico…anti-narcotics discourse and policy…served more often than not to create a 
climate of fear…which [served] to justify and legitimate political violence against 
marginalized sectors of society.”124  
The rise of the DEA and the issue of drugs suggest that the two replaced the OPS 
and communism as the arm and purpose of U.S. international law enforcement. Taking 
these observations and arguments into account, 1970s U.S. military aid destined for 
Mexico under the auspices of the “War on Drugs” should be looked at suspiciously. 
Whether or not American law enforcement personnel were party to atrocities committed 
by the Mexican government during the “Dirty War” cannot be verified at this time. If 
DEA agents were involved in Mexico’s “Dirty War,” though, the “drug war” in which 
DEA agents were participating could be viewed as a counter-revolutionary endeavor as 
well as a counternarcotic one. It is possible that U.S. military aid given to Mexico for the 
“drug war” was part of a larger oppressive, anti-leftist objective.  
But under pressure to reform the U.S.’s human rights image, Washington began to 
fix the mechanisms through which it financed and aided foreign police forces and 
militaries. Atrocities committed by U.S.-aided police elements abroad led the U.S. 
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government to incorporate human rights clauses into its foreign aid policies. Washington 
set up safeguards in hopes of preventing the U.S. from financing and providing aid to 
nations that perpetrated such crimes. “Through a series of increasingly tough measures, 
congress ordered the White House and the Department of State to slow or slash aid to 
countries responsible for human rights abuses.”125 The issue of international drug 
trafficking, however, may have provided a way to sidestep such policy roadblocks. 
The U.S. government was aware that leftist and dissident Mexicans were being 
“abducted, tortured, and murdered”126 by the Mexican state. Even so, U.S. financial and 
military aid for the “drug war” continued to flow to Mexico. Quoting the Mexico City 
CIA station chief Lawrence Sternfeld, “[it] was the height of the Cold War, and our 
efforts were against the Soviet target. Not that [the U.S. government wasn’t] aware that 
the Mexicans were doing bad things…but we didn’t raise that with them.”127 An Embassy 
document titled “FAA Section 32 – Political Prisoners” acknowledges the Mexican 
government’s perpetration of human rights violations. The document concludes, 
however, that despite the violations the “Mexican army commitment to joint U.S./GOM 
(government of Mexico) antidrug effort…far [outweighed] the monetary value of training 
provided by the USG (United States government).”128 In other words, the PRI’s brutal 
“Dirty War” could be forgiven as long as Mexico continued to participate in the U.S. 
government’s “War on Drugs.” Perhaps the U.S. government’s hesitation to cut off aid to 
Mexico was because of the success of the U.S.-Mexico “War on Drugs” as an 
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anticommunist intervention tactic. There is another argument to be made, though: The 
U.S.’s hesitation may have been predicated on the perception that the 1970s were, 
actually, a golden age of U.S.-Mexico drug enforcement. 
Mexico’s Opium Problem 
In his book Drug Control in the Americas, William O. Walker lauds Mexico for 
its antidrug effort saying, “Mexico, with its own resources and $90 million from the 
United States during the [1970s], was winning the war against heroin and perhaps 
marijuana as well.”129 Quoting former White House Director of Drug Abuse Policy Peter 
Bourne, “the ongoing activities of the Mexican and American governments in the field of 
drug control [ranked] among the most exemplary forms of international cooperation in 
the world.”130 This view that the U.S. and Mexico were winning the “War on Drugs” in 
the 1970s appears to have been rooted in reality, albeit a complicated reality.  
Mexico became a major producer of heroin for the United States almost 
overnight. Although Mexican drug producers and smugglers had long supplied the United 
States with heroin, it wasn’t until the dissolution of the French-Turkish heroin apparatus 
(The French Connection) in 1972 that Mexico became the U.S.’s primary supplier of the 
narcotic. Before U.S. antidrug agencies broke up the French Connection, Mexico 
accounted for about 38% of the heroin consumed in the United States. But the end of the 
French Connection left a hole in the heroin market. Mexican heroin producers filled the 
void in short order. According to a 1975 U.S. government document titled “The Potential 
of a Forward Strategy Against Heroin in Mexico,” “brown” Mexican heroin accounted 
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for 77% of the total heroin in the U.S by 1974. Meanwhile, Middle Eastern and Asian 
heroin combined to account for the middling remainder.131 From 1969 to 1974, the 
percentage of Mexican heroin on the U.S. drug market had exploded from between 15-
20% to dominate more than three quarters of the total market.  
Was it U.S. antidrug policy in Europe and Asia that propelled Mexico from a 
mostly marijuana-producing nation to the single largest provider of narcotics for the 
U.S.? There is an argument to be made that this was the case. The correlation between the 
shutdown of the French Connection and the explosion of Mexican heroin on the U.S. 
drug market is hard to dispute. By creating a vacuum in its domestic drug market, it 
appears that U.S. drug enforcement in Europe and Asia Minor generated the necessary 
conditions for Mexico to become the world’s largest producer of heroin. There is no 
evidence to suggest that this was intentional, and it is unlikely that U.S. drug enforcement 
action outside of Mexico was the only reason for the Mexican heroin spike.  
The Mexican economy was still in disarray in the mid-1970s. Inflation reached 
15%. Mexico’s deficit had spiraled out of control, reaching $2.8 billion. Its foreign debt 
was estimated to be $22 billion. GDP per capita income was $1,153.132 All the while, 
massive population growth was threatening to further destabilize the Mexican economy. 
As confidence in the government and the economy collapsed, there seemed to be one 
business that was seemingly unaffected by Mexico’s volatility: the drug trade.  
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  “[Opium was] much more lucrative than any legitimate crop, including opium for 
commercial use…[opium producers could] sell the product for over $1,000 per kilo.”133 
But neither Mexico nor the U.S. promoted structural changes such as economic or social 
reform as remedies to drug trafficking. The U.S. did propose introducing substitute crops 
to minimize the economic benefits of planting illicit drugs, but found this not to “be a 
feasible and worthwhile program…to pursue in Mexico.”134 Drug eradication was the be 
all and end all for the U.S. It was the only way Washington saw fit to staunch the torrent 
of drugs coming into the U.S. from Mexico.  
For its part, the Mexican congress passed mandatory sentences for drug 
trafficking offenses. The Mexican government “established penalties, including the 
confiscation of land and livestock, for persons who [permitted or induced] the planting of 
opium poppy or marijuana.”135 These laws seem pointedly directed at rural Mexicans. 
Indeed, it appears that the U.S.-Mexico “drug war” mostly targeted poor and 
marginalized populations outside of the Mexican mainstream. 
Certainly, drug cultivation, production, and trafficking were common in rural 
Mexico. For example, an estimated 200,000 campesinos in the Sinaloa area were 
involved in the drug traffic. Craig, quoting a Mexican drug official, notes, “[the Mexican 
rural poor wanted] to have a nice pair of pants, a nice hat, and a shirt. Like thousands of 
their countrymen, the Sinaloa campesinos [were] desperate, and they [sought] desperate 
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solutions to their problems.”136 These desperate solutions were drug cultivation, 
production, and trafficking. According to Craig, Mexico’s “War on Drugs” was much 
more a war on the poor than it was on the opium poppy or the marijuana leaf.137 In 
addition, he argues that rural Mexicans saw the “drug war” as a federal government 
attempt to “depistolize the campo”138 more than a drug eradication campaign. Craig’s 
argument here suggests, like Alexander’s, that the “War on Drugs” was primarily 
concerned with the perpetuation of a “status quo” than curbing drug use or traffic. U.S. 
government sources, though often disparaging of Mexico and Mexicans, do not call the 
“drug war” a war on the poor or a war on a certain race. But taking into account how the 
Mexican government’s proposed penalties for drug production and smuggling and the 
number of rural Mexican estimated to have been involved in the drug trade, it is feasible 
that the Mexican government treated the “drug war” as a means to assert control over 
poor, rural populations—the same populations that were vulnerable to leftist extremism. 
In conjunction with the criminal justice system, the Mexican government used force to 
oppress the poor and the left.  
 The Mexican state militarized the “drug war” by mobilizing the Mexican Federal 
Judicial Police (PJF) and armed forces. Additionally, the Mexican government 
established a drug enforcement police academy, and increased the size of the PJF by 
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more than 400 agents .139 Like the United States, Mexico spent the vast majority of its 
antidrug budget on enforcement, eradication, and interdiction. All told, the Mexican 
government spent $24 million in 1975 on the three phases of counternarcotics policy that 
the United States deemed so critical.140 Eradication, in fact, may have been critical given 
the proliferation of the Mexican drug crop. Mid 1970s Mexican government estimates 
held that 600,000 square kilometers of Mexican land were being used to grow marijuana 
and opium poppies, making up perhaps 30,000 plots. Some of the plots were said to be in 
excess of 40 acres.141 Believing that eradication was the only way to get Mexican drug 
production under control, the U.S. and Mexican governments designed Operation 
Condor. 
Drug Eradication: Joint U.S.-Mexico “Progress” and CIA Meddling 
 
The greatest accomplishment of Operation Condor might have been its scale. The 
joint U.S.-Mexico operation is still the largest drug eradication campaign ever 
undertaken.142 The Mexican government sent thousands of security personnel to the 
triángulo crítico, comprised of the states of Chihuahua, Durango, and Sinaloa, the most 
prolific drug-producing region in Mexico. Forces were sent to the states of Guerrero, 
Zacatecas, Michoacán, Oaxaca, Sonora and others, as well.143 In total, Mexico spent $35 
million on Operation Condor and mobilized 5,000 soldiers and 350 PJF agents for the 
drug eradication campaign.  The American side of the operation, called Operation Trizo 
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(short for Tri-Zone), was also directed primarily at the triángulo crítico. For its part, the 
United States supplied 76 aircraft and a whopping $150 million. Also, 30 U.S. agents 
were sent to Mexico to oversee and participate in the effort.144  
Even with the incredible proliferation of drug cultivation in Mexico, initial 
statistical returns from Condor were spectacular. A 1976 memo praised Condor saying, 
“in short, the eradication program [represented] a major success.”145 According to a U.S. 
government source, from November 1975 to April 1976, the joint U.S.-Mexican 
operation destroyed more than 22,000 opium fields, almost 3,000 marijuana fields, and 
14 heroin processing labs, and seized 116 kilograms of heroin, and 202.5 tons of 
marijuana. Additional statistics are similarly remarkable. Operation Condor resulted in 
the arrest of 1,602 Mexicans, and the confiscation of almost 1,000 guns, and more than 
200,000 rounds of ammunition.146 Another U.S. source exclaims, “the eradication phase 
of [Operation Condor was] a technological triumph in the first intensive…joint Mexican-
U.S. opium poppy eradication campaign.”147 DEA agents stationed in Mexico City 
believed they destroyed between 70-80% of the total Mexican brown heroin crop.148 
Incredibly, the United States government estimated that Operation Condor had 
successfully destroyed $692,040,000 worth of heroin.149 Gaudy statistics produced by 
Operation Condor made the U.S.-Mexico “drug war” appear winnable. And because of 
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the success of drug eradication, heroin on the streets of the United States became more 
expensive, less pure, less plentiful, and overdoses dramatically declined.150  
Although these statistics have to be taken with a substantial grain of salt because 
of the clandestine nature of the drug trade, such estimates still represent a concerted blow 
to the Mexican drug trafficking apparatus. Due to its perceived success, Operation 
Condor and drug eradication more generally became the model antidrug strategy for 
Latin American source countries like Bolivia.151 The exportation of this drug eradication 
strategy and the militarization it employed proves Operation Condor to be a pertinent 
example of the U.S. using Mexico to test the effectiveness of its burgeoning drug 
enforcement empire.  
In support of the theory that Operation Condor was a template for U.S. 
hemispheric drug control, it appears that the DEA played a large role in the U.S.-Mexico 
drug eradication campaign on the ground. In addition to training and arming the Mexican 
army and PJF, the DEA appears to have participated in Mexican drug enforcement. 
According to a U.S. government memorandum entitled “Drug Enforcement 
Administration re Operation Trizo,” the DEA “[furnished] assistance and aid to the 
Mexican eradication forces in the form of actual participation”152 throughout Operation 
Condor. Also, as stipulated in a U.S. Embassy document, “DEA [agents could] 
participate in MFJP (Mexican Federal Judicial Police) enforcement actions involving 
actual raids and seizures if the presence or participation of DEA agents [was 
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required].”153 Seeing as how the “Mexican government…encouraged an active DEA role 
in support of its program,”154 it’s possible that DEA participation in Mexican drug 
enforcement was common.  
Exactly what these raids and other forms of participation in Mexican drug 
enforcement entailed is not made clear by the documents. If we are to believe Pyes, 
Mexican drug enforcement was brutal. His claims remain, however, unsubstantiated by 
U.S. government sources. In any case, the militarization of the U.S.-Mexico “drug war” 
throughout the 1970s and the participatory presence of the DEA could suggest that 
paramilitary tactics used in drug enforcement were, in part, developed during the U.S.-
Mexico drug eradication effort. Interestingly, Alexander posits that police forces and 
SWAT teams didn’t start using paramilitary tactics in the U.S.’s domestic “drug war” 
until the 1980s:  
SWAT teams originated in the 1960s and gradually became more common in the 
1970s, but until the drug war, they were used rarely [in the U.S.], primarily for 
extraordinary emergency situations such as hostage takings, hijackings, or prison 
escapes. That changed in the 1980s, when local law enforcement agencies 
suddenly had access to cash and military equipment specifically for the purpose of 
conducting raids… In 1972, there were just a few hundred paramilitary drug raids 
per year in the United States. By the early 1980s, there were three thousand 
annual SWAT deployments.155 
 
Before the proliferation of U.S. SWAT teams, Mexican drug enforcement agents had 
access to and were using military equipment on a massive scale by the mid 1970s. The 
U.S. government source detailing the quantity of drugs seized and the numbers of people 
arrested in Operation Condor does not describe the raids in which arrests and drug 
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seizures occurred. Even so, one could presume that such drug enforcement activities had 
a paramilitary feel given the Mexican government’s penchant for such action. Whether or 
not the U.S. adopted domestic paramilitary drug enforcement strategies from Operation 
Condor and the U.S.-Mexico “drug war” is uncertain. The chronology suggests, 
nonetheless, that this is a possibility.  
Despite the apparent progress, the specter of communist subversion in the 
hemisphere continued to complicate U.S.-Mexico counternarcotics relations. Notably, 
Mexico City was home to the largest CIA station in Latin American throughout the Cold 
War.156 Inevitably, the CIA crossed paths with drugs in Mexico. This may have been, in 
part, because of the CIA’s relationship with the notoriously corrupt Mexican Federal 
Security Directorate (DFS). The near 40-year history of the DFS is sordid, and it worked 
closely with the CIA throughout the Cold War. Among the DFS’s many tasks was the 
violent repression of the Mexican left.157 It is speculated that “the DFS and the CIA 
shared information on suspected subversives, and anti-narcotics operations were 
frequently used as a device for quelling social movements and justifying the repression of 
political adversaries.”158 Besides its possible function as an anti-left paramilitary force, 
the DFS was considered the highest level of drug enforcement in Mexico. But instead of 
being responsible for drug enforcement, the DFS may have facilitated Mexican drug 
traffic. Scholar Jonathan Marshall believes that the DFS was the most powerful 
organizational force in the Mexican drug trade. Furthermore, Peter Watt and Roberto 
Zepeda observe that “so long as the DFS acted as an enforcer of anti-left wing repression, 
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minor issues like its control of the flow of narcotics into the United States were 
tolerated”159 by the CIA. There’s no way of proving this with the U.S. government 
documents found in the DNSA collections. If this were the case, however, the “War on 
Drugs” in Mexico could conclusively be considered a counter-revolutionary mechanism 
of anti-leftist oppression. 
Marshall’s argument is similar to that of Watt and Zepeda. According to Marshall, 
the “route to [drug] market domination [in Mexico lay] in developing ties with corrupt 
political leaders…and law enforcement authorities…[and] one of the most critical 
sources of such institutional protection for the drug trade [was] the [CIA].”160 
Furthermore, Marshall argues, the CIA may have been responsible for the meteoric rise 
of one the largest drug traffickers in Mexico of the 1970s, the Cuban-born Alberto Sicilia 
Falcón. He was, before his 1975 arrest, “the leader of the world’s largest cocaine and 
marijuana trafficking organization.”161 How he supposedly came to power is noteworthy. 
Sicilia claimed to be a CIA protégé and that he had been a participant in the U.S.’s secret 
war against Cuba. More importantly however, he is thought to have shipped arms to anti-
leftist groups throughout Latin America for the CIA in exchange for the protection of his 
drug empire.162  
Sicilia’s name does not appear in any of the U.S. government documents. Neither 
do the names of any major 1970s Mexican traffickers. In fact, all names not belonging to 
U.S. government higher-ups are redacted. Unfortunately, without names or even 
descriptions of actions that could explicitly identify Mexican traffickers like Sicilia, it is 
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impossible to say definitively how Mexican drug traffickers and the CIA were 
intertwined. Even so, given that the CIA has been involved in anticommunist drugs-for-
arms shadiness in Nicaragua in the 1980s,163 it wouldn’t be a stretch to believe that 
something similar had happened in Mexico during the preceding decade. Maybe the 
counter-revolutionary drugs-for-guns strategy was even developed by the CIA in Mexico. 
Evidence, again, is scarce, but CIA facilitation of drug traffickers in Mexico may indicate 
that the “War on Drugs,” at its highest levels, was more counter-revolutionary than 
counternarcotic. In any case, the CIA’s supposed involvement in the 1970s U.S.-Mexico 
“drug war” further obfuscates what was going on at the time. Considering these 
hypotheses, it is difficult to understand how the 1970s were considered a U.S.-Mexico 
counternarcotics golden age. 
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Conclusion 
The End of an Era 
 
1978 saw the end of Operation Condor. The Mexican government made it known 
that it no longer wished for the DEA to be involved in Mexican drug eradication 
campaigns. Yet, the only major change to be implemented was that DEA pilots would no 
longer be allowed to participate in or supervise Mexican eradication efforts.164 Otherwise, 
the DEA was still free to investigate, order arrests, and run undercover operations while 
Mexico ran its own eradication campaigns. Despite how this change seems trivial, it 
would prove to be a major setback for the U.S.-Mexico “drug war.” According to 
Shannon, the DFS and other Mexican officials corrupted Mexican drug eradication 
efforts in the absence of U.S. oversight. Drugs continued to be destroyed by Mexican 
personnel, but they destroyed drugs selectively. Supposedly, traffickers who had the 
money and power would pay off Mexican officials to protect their crops from the 
government. In turn, state-run drug crop extermination in Mexico, Shannon argues, was 
the catalyst for the formation of international drug cartels like those that sprung up on the 
Gulf Coast and in Guadalajara.165  
The centralization of drug trafficking in Mexico, however, may not have been 
caused solely by the absence of American supervision. In a 1990 Washington Post article, 
“DEA and Mexican officials [were] interviewed…[and] said that at a minimum, the CIA 
had turned a blind eye to a burgeoning drug trade in cultivating its relationship with the 
DFS and [pursued] what it regarded as other U.S. national security interests in 
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Mexico.”166 Predictably, the Cold War and the CIA continued to complicate the “War on 
Drugs” well after the 1970s. The Cold War may have even factored in the murder of 
Enrique Camarena. Those responsible for killing Camarena are said to have operated 
with “virtual impunity—not because [they were] in league with Mexico’s powerful 
Federal Security Directorate…but because…[their] activities were secretly sanctioned by 
the CIA.”167 Are the Cold War circumstances of Camarena’s murder indicative of the 
“War on Drugs’” counter-revolutionary nature? Perhaps the CIA turning a blind eye to 
drug trafficking in Mexico was an integral strategy in the U.S.’s Cold War protocol in 
Latin America. Perhaps a more unsettling question is whether or not the U.S. was 
intentionally trying to foster drug-related disorder and chaos in its southern neighbor. But 
this is impossible to prove. Wherever the truth lies, it is a fact that the intersection of 
U.S.-Mexico “War on Drugs” the Cold War, and the Mexican “Dirty War” did not result 
in peace of any kind. 
At least one source seems to have believed in the U.S. government’s power to 
create peace. In mid-February of 1979, Mexican President José López Portillo and 
American President Jimmy Carter met in Mexico City. This was the end of the Carter 
administration and three years before Ronald Reagan, according to Alexander, began to 
wage an all-out “War on Drugs” in the United States.168 A communiqué summarizing the 
meeting affirms Portillo and Carter’s belief in the United Nations. Both presidents saw it 
as the instrument through which the world would achieve peace. But there appears to be a 
typo in one of the first paragraphs of the communiqué. “United Nations” is mistakenly 
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replaced with “United States.” The error reads as follows: “Upon reviewing the 
international scene and the grave problems that affect world peace, both presidents 
reiterated their confidence in the United States [sic], convinced that this institution is the 
best alternative to achieve a peaceful world with equity and justice.”169 Whether this is 
intentional or a careless mistake is not clear. The U.S.’s antidrug policies between 1969-
1978, however, had created and resulted in anything but peace, equity, and justice for 
Mexico. By mandating drug eradication, interdiction, and enforcement, the U.S. 
government seems to have forced its southern neighbor into helping Washington preserve 
and perpetuate a U.S.-centric “status quo.” 
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